Berkshire is often labeled a conglomerate, a negative term applied to holding companies that own a hodge-podge of unrelated businesses. And, yes, that describes Berkshire – but only in part. 

伯克希爾經(jīng)常被貼上“綜合企業(yè)集團”的標簽，這是一個貶義詞，指的是擁有大量不相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)的控股公司。是的，這是對伯克希爾正確的描述——但這是部分。

Over time, conglomerates have generally limited themselves to buying businesses in their entirety. That strategy, however, came with two major problems. One was unsolvable: Most of the truly great businesses had no interest in having anyone take them over. Consequently, deal-hungry conglomerateurs had to focus on so-so companies that lacked important and durable competitive strengths. 

長期以來，綜合企業(yè)集團通常只局限于收購整個企業(yè)。然而，這一戰(zhàn)略帶來了兩個大問題。有一個問題是無解的：大多數(shù)真正偉大的企業(yè)都無意讓別人接管。因此，渴望收購的綜合企業(yè)集團不得不專注于那些缺乏重要和持久競爭優(yōu)勢的一般公司。

Beyond that, as conglomerateurs dipped into this universe of mediocre businesses, they often found themselves required to pay staggering “control” premiums to snare their quarry. Aspiring conglomerateurs knew the answer to this “overpayment” problem: They simply needed to manufacture a vastly overvalued stock of their own that could be used as a “currency” for pricey acquisitions. 

除此之外，當綜合企業(yè)集團不得不收購平庸的公司時，他們常常發(fā)現(xiàn)自己需要支付驚人的“控制權(quán)”溢價，以誘捕他們的獵物。一些精明的企業(yè)集團知道如何解決這個“超額支付”的問題：他們只需讓自己公司估值變得高得離譜，來作為昂貴收購的“貨幣”。 

Often, the tools for fostering the overvaluation of a conglomerate’s stock involved promotional techniques and “imaginative” accounting maneuvers that were, at best, deceptive and that sometimes crossed the line into fraud. When these tricks were “successful,” the conglomerate pushed its own stock to, say, 3x its business value in order to offer the target 2x its value.

通常，讓綜合企業(yè)集團股票估值過高的手段包括促銷和“富有想象力的”會計操作，這些手段充其量是欺騙性的，有時甚至會越界成為欺詐。當這些招數(shù)“成功”時，該集團會將自己的股價推至商業(yè)價值的三倍，以便收購估值是實際價值兩倍的目標公司。

Eventually, the party ends, and many business “emperors” are found to have no clothes. Financial history is replete with the names of famous conglomerateurs who were initially lionized as business geniuses by journalists, analysts and investment bankers, but whose creations ended up as business junkyards.

最終，盛宴結(jié)束，許多商業(yè)“皇帝”沒穿衣服。金融歷史上充斥著許多著名企業(yè)集團的名字，這些企業(yè)家最初被記者、分析師和投資銀行家譽為商業(yè)天才，但后來卻被拋進商業(yè)垃圾場。

Charlie and I want our conglomerate to own all or part of a diverse group of businesses with good economic characteristics and good managers. Whether Berkshire controls these businesses, however, is unimportant to us. Owning a non-controlling portion of a wonderful business is more profitable, more enjoyable and far less work than struggling with 100% of a marginal enterprise.

芒格和我希望我們的企業(yè)集團擁有具有良好財務(wù)狀況和優(yōu)秀經(jīng)理人的多元化企業(yè)集團的全部或部分，而伯克希爾是否控制這些業(yè)務(wù)對我們來說并不重要。擁有一個很棒的企業(yè)的不控股股權(quán)，要比擁有控股100%的掙扎在邊緣企業(yè)更有利可圖，更愉快，更少工作量。

以上內(nèi)容節(jié)選自《巴菲特2021年致股東信》

由數(shù)字人巴菲特播報

本視頻由七華軟件用人工智能技術(shù)生成