Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.

查理和我主要通過投資兩種高度相關(guān)的股權(quán)類型來配置大家的儲(chǔ)蓄資金。首先，我們投資于可以控股的公司，這一類我們通常選擇100%收購。伯克希爾公司指導(dǎo)這些公司如何進(jìn)行資源配置并幫助他們選出適合的CEO。在管理大型企業(yè)時(shí)，信任和規(guī)則都是必不可少的。伯克希爾公司非常強(qiáng)調(diào)前者，我們對(duì)業(yè)務(wù)錯(cuò)誤有較高的容忍度，但對(duì)個(gè)人不當(dāng)行為的容忍度為零。

In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management. Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

我們的第二類投資方式是通過購買公開交易的股票持有企業(yè)股份股權(quán)。對(duì)于這些投資，我們?cè)诠芾砩蠜]有發(fā)言權(quán)。但我們的目標(biāo)是，在擁有長期有利的經(jīng)濟(jì)特征和值得信任的管理者的企業(yè)中進(jìn)行有意義的投資。需要注意的是，我們持有這類股票，是基于對(duì)公司長期業(yè)務(wù)表現(xiàn)向好的判斷，而不是將其看作是短期買賣的工具。這一點(diǎn)非常重要：查理和我不是選股專家，而選企業(yè)的專家。

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. 

多年來，我犯過很多錯(cuò)誤。因此，雖然我們目前的投資組合中有一些具有真正非凡經(jīng)濟(jì)效益的企業(yè)，但也有一部分企業(yè)已經(jīng)倒閉，它們的產(chǎn)品不受公眾歡迎。資本主義有兩面性：這個(gè)體系在造就越來越多的輸家的同時(shí)，也提供了大量的改善型商品和服務(wù)。

One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.

我們?cè)诠_交易市場的一個(gè)優(yōu)勢是，偶爾可以很容易地以極好的價(jià)格買進(jìn)優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)。股價(jià)交易的價(jià)格往往非常離譜，有可能會(huì)很高，也有可能會(huì)很低，“有效”市場只存在于教科書中。事實(shí)上，市場上的股票和債券價(jià)格常常令人困惑，通常只有在事后才能將其理解。

Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation．

控股企業(yè)的情況則有所不同，有時(shí)它們的價(jià)格高到離譜，但幾乎不會(huì)出現(xiàn)便宜的估值。除非是在迫不得已的情況下，不然控股企業(yè)的所有者不會(huì)考慮以恐慌性的估值進(jìn)行出售。